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Abstract	
While	grand	corruption	is	a	major	global	governance	challenge,	researchers	notably	lack	a	
systematic	 methodology	 for	 conducting	 qualitative	 research	 into	 its	 complex	 forms.	 To	
address	this	lacuna,	the	following	article	sets	out	and	applies	the	corruption	investigative	
framework	(CIF),	a	methodology	designed	to	generate	a	systematic,	transferable	approach	
for	grand	corruption	research.	Its	utility	will	be	demonstrated	employing	a	case	study	that	
centres	on	an	Australian‐led	megaproject	being	built	 in	Papua	New	Guinea’s	capital	city,	
Port	Moresby.	 Unlike	 conventional	 analyses	 of	 corruption	 in	 Papua	 New	 Guinea,	 which	
emphasise	its	local	characteristics	and	patrimonial	qualities,	application	of	CIF	uncovered	
new	empirical	layers	that	centre	on	transnational	state‐corporate	power,	the	ambiguity	of	
civil	 society,	 and	 the	 structural	 inequalities	 that	marginalise	 resistance	movements.	 The	
important	 theoretical	 consequences	 of	 the	 findings	 and	 underpinning	methodology	 are	
explored.	
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Introduction		
As	 a	 specific	 modality	 of	 corruption,1	 grand	 corruption	 is	 commonly	 distinguished	 by	 three	
factors	(Bloom	2014;	Jain	2001).	First,	it	involves	significant	economic	value,	either	in	monetary	
or	asset	form.	Second,	the	corrupt	activity	is	ordinarily	not	an	isolated	incident,	but	rather	part	of	
a	 systemic	 pattern	 of	 conduct.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 enacted/facilitated	 by	 senior	 officials	 capable	 of	
harnessing	policy,	 laws	 and	organisational	machinery	 to	prosecute	 the	 requisite	 transactions,	
creating	enduring	institutional	cultures,	repertoires	and	processes	that	are	favourable	to	corrupt	
forms	of	activity.	
	
Research	 into	grand	 corruption	 is	 beset	by	a	number	of	 significant	 challenges	 that	have	been	
experienced	more	generally	by	scholars	inquiring	into	the	crimes	of	the	powerful	(see	Tombs	and	
Whyte	2003).	Most	 fundamentally,	 our	 ability	 to	 analyse	and	 theorise	 grand	 corruption	 in	 its	
particular	 spatio‐temporal	 forms	 depends	 on	 systematic	 fieldwork	 that	 can	 document	 in	 rich	
detail	 the	 national	 and	 transnational	 networks,	 schemes,	 mechanisms	 and	 infrastructure	
essential	to	its	organisation.	Unlike	some	arenas	of	social	inquiry,	where	the	challenge	is	primarily	
one	of	selecting	the	right	set	of	methods	for	exploring	an	environment	that	is	either	welcoming	
or	indifferent	to	the	researcher,	grand	corruption	research	faces	a	subject	which	is	actively	hostile	
to	approximation.		
	
As	a	result,	the	increasingly	large	scholarly	landscape	dealing	with	corruption	has	tended	to	focus	
on	more	accessible	areas	of	inquiry,	including	definitional	debates,	macro‐measures	of	corruption	
levels,	gauging	its	economic	impacts,	and	frameworks	for	evaluating	anti‐corruption	initiatives	
(Schoeneborn	and	Homberg	2016;	Torsello	and	Vernard	2016).	Less	urgency	has	been	given	to	
the	 task	 of	 producing	 robust	 empirical	 data‐sets	 that	 document	 the	 precise	 motivations,	
institutional	structures,	actor	networks,	illicit	repertoires	and	terrains	of	impunity	that	underpin	
grand	corruption	schemes.		
	
This	article	contends	that,	unless	serious	attention	is	paid	to	grand	corruption	at	a	molecular,	
qualitative	 level—focusing	 on	 how	 it	 is	 organised,	 executed	 and	 concealed—through	 the	
development	of	comparable,	investigative	data‐sets	and	applied	theory,	understanding	how	and	
where	it	exists	risks	becoming	educated	guess	work.	Against	this	backdrop,	the	following	article	
applies	a	series	of	methodological	innovations—the	corruption	investigative	framework	(CIF)—
developed	 by	 the	 author	 in	 a	 bid	 to	 construct	 a	 systematic	 and	 transferable	 approach	 for	
qualitative	grand	corruption	research,	which	is	capable	of	documenting	its	organisational	spokes,	
institutional	mechanisms	and	facilitating	activities	(see	also	Lasslett	forthcoming).	
	
CIF	has	been	honed	through	fieldwork	in	diverse	settings,	including	Papua	New	Guinea	(PNG)	and	
Uzbekistan.	To	exhibit	 its	exploratory	power,	a	case	study	will	be	presented	that	 focuses	on	a	
public‐private	megaproject	which	will	transform	a	former	national	park	into	a	luxury	estate.	This	
site	will	 evidently	 be	 used	 to	 co‐host	 the	 Asia‐Pacific	 Economic	 Cooperation	 (APEC)	 summit,	
scheduled	to	take	place	in	Port	Moresby	during	November	2018,	with	support	from	both	the	PNG	
and	 Australian	 governments.	 Using	 CIF,	 data‐sets	 were	 produced	 which	 illuminate	 the	 key	
individual	 and	 organisational	 actors	 involved	 in	 this	 public‐private	 initiative,	 including	 their	
professional	 biographies,	 ties	 with	 political	 power	 centres,	 core	 group	 adhesives,	 and	 the	
commercial	 repertoires	 employed	 to	obtain	and	develop	a	prime	Port	Moresby	 location.	Data	
analysis	uncovered	evidence	of	illegal	transactions	and	conflicts	of	interest.	
	
Critically,	 these	results	contain	insights	which	adds	a	new	dimension	to	existing	scholarly	and	
policy	 tracts	 on	 grand	 corruption	 in	 PNG.	 Informed	 predominantly	 by	 neo‐patrimonial	
frameworks,	the	literature	has	focused	on	clientalistic	models	of	distributive	politics	that	have	
emerged	within	an	ethnically	fractured	population,	and	a	parliamentary	system	lacking	coherent	
party	politics.	For	example,	the	World	Bank	observes:	‘a	particular	characteristic	of	the	traditional	
culture	 of	 PNG	 …	 is	 a	 system	 of	 relationships/obligations	 between	 individuals	 connected	 by	
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common	origin,	hailing	 from	common	geographic	area,	sharing	common	kinship	and	common	
language	…	[which]	can	provide	a	strong	incentive	for	nepotistic	and	corrupt	practices’	(2011:	
17).		
	
Against	this	backdrop,	the	data	presented	here	reveals	transnational	state‐corporate	activity	that	
centres	 on	 complex	 forms	of	market	 and	 regulatory	manipulation,	 designed	 to	 extract	 super‐
profits	 through	 targeting	 vulnerable	 revenue	 streams	 and	 assets.	 The	 latter	 activity	 was	
spearheaded	 by	 a	 developer	 coalition	 led	 by	 Australian‐based	 executives	 espousing	 strong	
corporate	 social	 responsibility	 credentials,	 backed	 by	 key	 sections	 of	 the	 human	 rights	
community.	 This	 particular	 international	 dimension	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising:	 Australian	
corporate	 interests	 have	 dominated	 PNG’s	 national	 economy	 over	 the	 past	 forty	 years	 since	
independence	in	1975,	drawing	on	the	cultural	capital	and	power	Australia	enjoys	as	the	former	
colonial	authority.	This	dominance	is	justified	by	citing	the	beneficial	role	Australian	investment	
plays	in	bringing	‘development’	to	PNG	and	promoting	good	governance,	a	contention	that	is	yet	
to	be	comprehensively	scrutinised.		
	
On	that	note,	an	introduction	to	CIF	will	now	be	provided,	before	I	then	turn	to	the	case	study	and	
its	theoretical	implications.		
	
The	corruption	investigative	framework		
CIF	 is	 grounded	 in	 a	 unified	 approach	 to	 data	 collection	 and	 data	 analytics.	 This	 approach	 is	
facilitated	through	a	set	of	elementary	and	advanced	units	of	analysis	that,	as	a	whole,	create	an	
investigative	vantage	point	for	honing	fieldwork	and	conducting	data	analysis.	The	elementary	
units	 include	nodes	(actors),	 ties	(relations)	and	transactions.	They	are	among	the	most	basic	
constituting	components	of	corrupt	schemes.	The	advanced	units	of	analysis	capture	the	broader	
structures	and	processes	of	which	elementary	units	form	part.	These	structures	and	processes	
include	 network	 architecture,	 transaction	 sequences,	 node	 (actor)	 biographies	 and	
commercial/political	 repertoires,	 which	 as	 a	 totality	 helps	 to	 disclose	 the	 criminogenic	
motivations,	 opportunity	 structures	 and	 compliance	 cultures	 underpinning	 regionally	 specific	
forms	of	grand	corruption.	
	
Turning	to	the	basic	units	of	analysis,	nodes	designate	 the	differentiated	subjects	 (actors)	and	
objects	 within	 a	 social	 system	 underpinning	 grand	 corruption.	 These	 include,	 for	 instance,	
individual	actors,	public	 institutions,	corporate	entities,	valuable	assets	and	 forums	(such	as	a	
conference	 or	 social	 club).	 Clearly,	 if	 grand	 corruption	 is	 to	 be	 empirically	 documented	 in	 its	
concrete,	 historical	 forms,	 key	 nodal	 points—such	 as	 ‘fixers’,	 front	 companies,	 political	
powerbrokers,	 targeted	 assets,	 important	 decision‐making	 forums,	 and	 civil	 society	 actors	
mounting	resistance—must	be	plotted.	It	is	also	vital	that	the	ties	linking	nodes	are	traced.	They	
might	include	ownership,	partnership,	kinship,	contractor‐client,	employment	or	rivalry,	to	name	
just	a	few	examples.		
	
Of	 course,	 for	 a	 social	 system	 to	 exist,	 it	 must	 have	 active	 components	 that	 are	 instigating	
momentum.	 The	 transaction	 is	 a	 basic	 category	 designed	 to	 designate	 any	 single,	 identifiable	
action,	which	 takes	place	within	a	social	system.	 It	might	 include,	 for	example,	 the	 transfer	of	
money	between	offshore	bank	accounts,	or	a	government	committee’s	decision	to	grant	valuable	
economic	rights	to	a	particular	firm.		
	
The	advanced	units	of	analysis	CIF	employs	have	emerged	 inductively	over	a	 ten‐year	period,	
whilst	researching	grand	corruption	in	the	Pacific	and	Eurasia.	They	evolved	out	of	finer‐grained	
analyses	conducted	using	the	elementary	units	of	analysis,	which	laid	the	foundation	for	building	
concepts	 capable	 of	 capturing	 the	 broader	 structures	and	processes,	 of	which	 these	molecular	
determinations	are	part.	
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The	first	advanced	category,	network	architecture,	focuses	on	the	social	network	as	an	evolving	
totality,	 looking	at	the	structured	inter‐relativeness	between	its	constituting	elements,	and	the	
concrete	meanings	 these	elements	obtain	as	 a	 result	of	 the	 system	 to	which	 they	belong.	For	
example,	politician	A	may	act	as	a	bridge	between	investors	B,	C	and	D,	and	the	President	of	a	
nation.	By	acting	as	a	conduit	between	the	investors	and	a	paramount	decision	maker,	politician	
A	is	able	to	fix	public	tenders	using	the	President’s	office;	while,	the	President	enjoys	insulation	
from	the	immediate	zone	of	illicit	activity,	minimising	the	risk	of	exposure.	From	the	President’s	
vantage	point,	Politician	A	is	a	buffer;	from	the	vantage	point	of	the	investors,	he	is	a	fixer;	for	
both	sides,	Politician	A	is	an	asset.	So	network	architecture	is	a	frame	that	instigates	a	strategic	
focus	on	the	dynamics	that	emerge	from	forms	of	inter‐relatedness,	that	can	only	be	concretely	
uncovered	by	looking	at	the	broader	whole.		
	
The	transaction	sequence	is	another	advanced	unit	of	analysis.	It	hones	attention	on	an	expanse	
of	inter‐connected	transactions,	authored	by	a	single	or	by	multiple	entities.	In	effect,	this	frame	
focuses	the	investigative	lens	on	the	different	ways	in	which	transactions	may	connect	together	
to	form	part	of	a	sequence	that	drives	a	corrupt	schema	from	conception	to	fruition.	For	example,	
an	overarching	sequence	may	involve	marshalling	security	force	members	to	intimidate	rivals,	
journalists	and	civil	society,	which	occurs	in	tandem	with	the	rigging	of	a	government	committee,	
so	an	oil	 contract	 is	 awarded	 to	 an	offshore	 company,	owned	by	members	of	 the	 intelligence	
services,	who	provide	kickbacks	to	the	President.	Meanwhile,	lawyers,	bankers	and	accountants	
are	contracted	to	launder	the	proceeds	into	safe	havens	in	Europe	and	North	America.	Elsewhere	
I	have	set	out	 in	greater	detail	precise	 techniques	 that	can	be	used	 to	 reconstruct	 transaction	
sequences	(see	Lasslett	forthcoming).		
	
Node	biography	is	another	advanced	unit	of	analysis.	It	hones	attention	on	particular	individual	
and	organisational	actors	within	a	network,	looking	at	their	existence	through	a	life‐history	lens.	
Whether	an	individual,	company	or	public	institution,	it	becomes	possible	in	some	instances	to	
capture	how	 they	have	developed	over	 time.	 In	 the	 case	of	 individuals,	 this	might	 include	 an	
expansion	in	particular	forms	of	influence,	the	honing	of	specific	skill‐sets,	and	the	command	of	
key	tools	(for	example,	offshore	accounts,	shell	companies,	double	accounting);	or	in	the	case	of	
organisations,	the	fostering	of	certain	institutional	cultures	and	customs,	etcetera.	Indeed,	node	
biographies,	 in	 effect,	 offer	 a	 frame	 through	 which	 to	 understand	 how	 existing	 structures,	
processes,	capacities	and	techniques	potentially	articulate	a	longer	period	of	activity	that	has	now	
congealed	 into	 criminogenic	 infrastructure,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 organisations,	 or	 expert	 personas	
proficient	in	illicit	schemes,	in	the	case	of	individuals.		
	
By	 studying	 different	 node	 biographies	 and	 associated	 transaction	 sequences,	 established	
commercial	and	political	repotoires	that	may	exist	in	a	particular	field	of	practice	can	begin	to	be	
designated.	 That	 is,	 enduring	 sets	 of	 techniques	 and	 informal	 bodies	 of	 knowledge,	 which	
individual	nodes	can	master	through	association	with	skilled	practitioners,	can	be	pinpointed	so	
as	 to	more	 effectively	 prosecute	 corrupt	 schemes	within	 a	 specific	 sector	 of	 the	 economy,	 or	
within	a	particular	government	agency.		
	
The	fieldwork	component	of	CIF	is	enacted	using	a	number	of	digitally	enhanced	investigative	
methods,	which	 aim	 to	 extract	 data	 from	documentary	 records	 and	 interviews,	 that	 can	 help	
populate	the	elementary	units	of	analysis	outlined	above.	Once	collected,	the	data‐sets	are	then	
coded	 and	 analysed	 using	 several	 techniques	 including	 investigative	 social	 network	 analysis	
(ISNA)	and	transaction	mapping,	which	enables	data	relating	to	the	elementary	units	of	analysis	
to	produce	understandings	that	populate	the	advanced	units	of	analysis,	upon	which	theorisation	
and	explanation	can	occur.		
	
ISNA	has	been	conducted	using	the	community	version	of	Maltego	Casefile.	Casefile	allows	node	
and	 tie	 data	 to	be	 coded	and	mapped	on	digraphs	 (directional	 graphs)	 so	 that	 it	 can	 then	be	
evaluated	drawing	on	concepts	developed	within	the	social	network	analysis	 literature,	which	
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help	to	disclose	network	power	dynamics,	weaknesses	and	vulnerabilities	(see	Figure	1	for	the	
style	of	Maltego	Casefile	digraphic	presentations).	Transaction	mapping	compliments	 ISNA.	 In	
this	case,	Tiki‐Toki	has	been	used.	This	timeline	software	package	allows	transaction	data	to	be	
plotted	on	a	graph	and	coded	on	three	bases:	author,	date	and	type	(see	Figure	2	for	the	style	of	
Tiki‐Toki	graph	presentations).	
	
	
Figure	1:	Modelling	network	data	in	Maltego	Casefile	
	
	
Figure	2:	Modelling	transaction	data	in	Tiki‐Toki	
Kristian	Lasslett:	Uncovering	…	Grand	Corruption:	Building	an	Investigative	Methodology	
	
IJCJ&SD							6	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(4)	
If	CIF	is	to	render	meaningful	results,	it	requires	a	reliable	supply	of	data	from	the	field.	To	that	
end,	in	the	case	study	presented	here,	the	author	drew	on	documentary	and	oral	sources.	In	the	
former	respect,	company	records	 from	PNG’s	corporate	registry	were	accessed	(certificates	of	
incorporation,	 company	 extracts,	 share	 issue/transfers,	 director	 appointment/replacements,	
secretary	appointment/replacements,	annual	returns);	in	addition,	the	registry	was	scraped—a	
method	 of	 batch	 data	 extraction	 from	 websites—in	 order	 to	 build	 a	 comprehensive	 list	 of	
corporate	entities	associated	with	individuals	in	the	network	(see	below).	Physical	planning	and	
lands	data	were	obtained	from	the	Department	of	Lands	and	Physical	Planning,2	and	from	the	
PNG	government	gazette.	A	personal	database	of	anti‐corruption	reporting	produced	in	PNG	was	
built,	populated	by	reports	the	author	located	through	office	visits,	library	searches	and	online	
searches,	including	from	the	Auditor	General’s	Office,	Public	Accounts	Committee,	Ombudsman	
Commission,	Commissions	of	Inquiry,	and	the	National	and	Supreme	Court	of	PNG;	this	database	
facilitated	 background	 checks	 of	 network	 nodes	 (it	 now	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 public	 archive:	 see	
www.pngiportal.org).	Searches	of	media	reporting	were	also	conducted	using	Nexis	and	Google.	
To	enhance	the	analysis	and	interpretation	of	data	extracted	from	records,	the	author	devoted	
considerable	 time	 to	 building	 both	 technical	 literacy	 and	 legal	 literacy	 in	 the	 relevant	
areas/sectors	 under	 examination.	 Time	 was	 also	 devoted	 to	 improving	 methods	 for	 data	
modelling	and	triangulation.		
	
As	well	as	documentary	research,	semi‐structured	interviews	were	conducted	with	civil	society	
organisations	representing	affected	residents	including	the	Paga	Hill	Heritage	Association,	Paga	
Hill	Arts	Resistance,	the	National	Housing	Commission	Residents’	Association	(Paga	Hill)	and	the	
legal	team	retained	to	advance	the	residents’	National	Court	action.	In	addition,	interviews	were	
conducted	with	 two	 senior	 executives	 from	 the	 proponent,	 Paga	 Hill	 Development	 Company	
(PNG)	Limited;	the	Member	of	Parliament	 for	Moresby	South;	and	a	land	conveyancing	expert	
with	direct	knowledge	of	the	project.		
	
Speaking	more	generally,	CIF’s	evidentiary	strength	lies	in	data	extraction,	data	consolidation	and	
triangulation.	Given	grand	corruption’s	opaque	nature,	CIF	attempts	to	counter	the	substantial	
challenges	fieldworkers	face	by	generating	a	diverse	range	of	information	streams,	tapped	from	
numerous	 sources	 (as	 outlined	 above,	 for	 example).	 The	 aforementioned	 analytical	 tools	 sift	
relevant	data	connected	to	the	elementary	units	of	analysis	from	these	streams.	The	information	
is	 then	 consolidated	 through	 data‐modelling	 exercises	 using	 ISNA	 and	 transaction‐mapping,	
which	in	turn	allows	the	advanced	units	of	analysis	to	be	populated	with	processed	data.	This	
process	of	data	analysis	and	triangulation	as	a	totality	aims	to	overcome	weaknesses	associated	
with	 any	 one	 data	 stream,	 or	 the	 fragmented	way	 in	which	 data	will	 often	 be	 located	 during	
fieldwork.	
	
On	that	note,	I	will	now	turn	to	the	case	study	built	using	CIF.	
	
‘Corrupt	dealings’,	state‐violence	and	transnational	market	manipulation:	The	Paga	Hill	
Estate	
Introduction	
During	2016,	the	business	press	announced	that	the	APEC	summit,	scheduled	to	be	held	in	PNG’s	
capital	Port	Moresby	during	2018,	would	be	 co‐hosted	at	 a	 new	 luxury	 estate	 in	 the	 capital’s	
harbour	 precinct	 valued	 at	 three	 billion	 Papua	 New	 Guinean	 Kina	 (K)	 (approximately	 US$1	
billion).	 The	 Paga	Hill	 Development	 Company	 (PNG)	 Limited	 (PHDC)	 is	 the	 lead	 partner	 in	 a	
developer	 coalition	 charged	with	 responsibility	 for	 this	mega‐project	 known	 as	 the	 Paga	Hill	
Estate	 (named	 after	 the	 hill	 upon	which	 the	 development	will	 be	 built;	 see	 Figure	 3);3	 other	
coalition	members	include	the	national	government	of	PNG	and	Chinese	investors	(PHDC	2017).		
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Figure	3:	Site	of	Paga	Hill	Estate	2016	
Source:	Google	Earth	
	
PHDC’s	most	 visible	 face	 is	 its	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer,	 Gudmundur	 Fridriksson.	 Fridriksson’s	
website	biography	(at	www.gudmundurfridriksson.com)	states,	he	‘is	a	business	leader	with	over	
30	 years	 of	 experience	 in	 managing	 major	 projects	 in	 Europe,	 China,	 Hong	 Kong,	 PNG	 and	
Australia’.	 Until	 2012,	 Fridriksson	 acted	 as	 a	 senior	 policy	 maker	 in	 Australia,	 charged	 with	
responsibility	 for	 overseeing	 an	 ambitious	 programme	 of	 welfare	 reform	 within	 indigenous	
communities,	in	collaboration	with	the	Queensland	and	Australian	governments,	which	together	
invested	over	AU$100	million	in	the	welfare	reform	project.		
	
PHDC	also	attracted	attention	because	of	its	strong	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	policy.	
The	keystone	of	this	CSR	policy,	led	by	Dame	Carol	Kidu	who	is	widely	regarded	as	one	of	PNG’s	
foremost	human	rights	advocates,	is	its	resettlement	package	for	the	communities	displaced	by	
the	megaproject.	This	combination	of	professional	excellence	and	human	rights	credibility	led	the	
United	Nations	Development	Programme	to	formally	commend	PHDC.		
	
However,	on	the	margins	of	civil	society,	community	activists	allege	that	PHDC	and	its	partners	
employed	bribery,	violence	and	intimidation	to	silence	critics	and	forcefully	displace	residents	
(Fifer	2016).	Research	into	these	allegations	began	in	2012	using	CIF,	and	continued	for	a	further	
four	 years.	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 key	 findings	 will	 now	 be	 presented	 before	 looking	 at	 their	
theoretical	 implications.	 First,	 the	 social	 network	underpinning	 the	megaproject	 is	 examined;	
attention	is	also	given	to	the	important	discoveries	made	after	biographical	data	was	collected	on	
key	executives	at	the	centre	of	this	network.	I	then	turn	to	the	transaction	sequences	which	have	
been	 employed	 to	 enact	 the	 Paga	 Hill	 Estate,	 looking	 at	 the	 illicit	 moments	 which	 became	
apparent	 through	 the	 transaction	 mapping	 process.	 The	 case	 study	 concludes	 by	 looking	 at	
auxiliary	 players	whose	 actions	 helped	 to	 buttress	 the	 developer’s	 impunity.	 Throughout	 the	
presentation,	CIF’s	techniques	are	referenced	to	demonstrate	their	impact	on	the	data	gathering	
and	analysis	process.		
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The	social	network	behind	the	Paga	Hill	Estate	and	key	actor	biographies		
The	 foundations	 of	 the	 Paga	 Hill	 megaproject	 rest	 on	 three	 core	 legal	 documents	 and	 two	
corporate	entities.	 The	 three	 core	 legal	documents	 are	 successive	 state	 leases	 that	have	been	
awarded	over	13.7	hectares	of	land	at	Paga	Hill	known	as	portion	1597,	a	plot	which	had	initially	
been	reserved	in	1987	as	a	national	park.	The	first,	a	five‐year	Urban	Development	Lease,	was	
issued	to	the	Paga	Hill	Land	Holding	Company	(PHLHC)	in	1998.	It	was	then	transformed	into	a	
99‐year	Business	Lease	in	2000.	However,	the	lessee	in	this	instance	was	a	separate	company,	
PHDC	(see	Diagram	1).	A	 fresh	99‐year	Business	Lease	was	 issued	over	the	property	 in	2009.	
Again	the	recipient	was	PHDC.	
	
	
Diagram	1:	Executive	team	behind	PHLHC	and	PHDC	
Source:	Investment	Promotion	Authority		
	
The	 first	Paga	Hill	 leaseholder,	PHLHC,	 is	 closely	connected	 to	Gudmundur	Fridriksson,	 and	a	
prominent	PNG	businessman,	Rex	Paki.	Paki	was	both	a	shareholder	and	director	of	PHLHC.4	The	
other	 shareholders	 were	 Felix	 Leyagon—an	 employee	 at	 Paki’s	 accountancy	 company—and	
Fidelity	 Management	 Pty	 Ltd.	 The	 latter	 entity	 is	 an	 Australian	 company,5	 owned	 by	 proxy	
shareholders6	based	at	the	accountancy	firm	Sothertons.	When	registered	addresses	extracted	
from	PNG	company	records	were	cross‐referenced	with	Fidelity’s	office	at	Sothertons	in	Western	
Australia,	it	became	apparent	that	Gudmundur	Fridriksson	had	used	Sothertons	as	his	registered	
address	for	a	separate	PNG	holding	company.7	This	strongly	suggested	he	was	linked	to	Fidelity	
Management,	in	addition	to	being	a	PHLHC	director.	The	second	main	corporate	vehicle,	PHDC,	
which	 has	 held	 two	 state	 leases	 over	 portion	 1597,	 is	 more	 closely	 tied	 to	 Fridriksson,	 his	
Australian	colleague,	George	Hallit,	and	the	company’s	lawyer,	Stanley	Liria.	During	the	fieldwork	
process,	background	checks	were	conducted	on	these	core	network	nodes	(actors).		
	
These	checks	revealed	that	both	Fridriksson	and	Paki	had	been	implicated	by	public	oversight	
institutions	and	journalists	in	a	range	of	illegal	activities.	For	example,	Fridriksson	had	managed	
and	owned	companies	censured	in	two	media	exposés,	two	Auditor	General’s	Office	reports,	four	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 inquiries,	 and	 the	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 into	 the	Department	 of	
Finance	(Table	1).		
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Table	1:	Paga	Hill	Estate	executives	and	their	links	to	public	inquiries	
Company	and	personnel	 Inquiry	citations	
Paga	Hill	Land	Holding	Company	(1996‐2009)
Rex	Paki	–	Director/Shareholder	
Gudmundur	Fridriksson	–	Director	
Fidelity	Management	Pty	Ltd*	–	Shareholder		
*Fidelity	 Management	 Pty	 Ltd	 is	 a	 Perth	 based	
holding	 company,	 which	 shared	 a	 registered	
address	with	Mr	Gudmundur	Fridriksson.	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 Report	 to	 Parliament	 on	 the	
Inquiry	into	the	Department	of	Lands	and	Physical	Planning	
(2007)	
Paga	 Hill	 Development	 Company	 (PNG)	
Limited	(2000‐current)	
Fidelity	 Management	 Pty	 Ltd*	 –	 Shareholder	
(2000‐2005)	
Gudmundur	Fridriksson	–	Chief	Executive	Officer,	
Director	and	Shareholder**	(2005‐2009)	
George	Hallit	–	Chief	Operations	Officer	
Stanley	Liria	–	Director/Shareholder	
Michael	Nali	–	Shareholder	(2011‐2016)***	
*Fidelity	 Management	 Pty	 Ltd	 is	 a	 Perth	 based	
holding	 company,	 which	 shared	 a	 registered	
address	with	Mr	Gudmundur	Fridriksson.	
**	 Though	 Anvil	 Holdings	 Limited	 and	 Palimb	
Holdings	Limited	
***	Through	Kwadi	Inn	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 Report	 to	 Parliament	 on	 the	
Inquiry	into	the	Department	of	Lands	and	Physical	Planning	
(2007)	
Anvil	 (PNG)	Project	 Services	 Limited	 (2001‐
2005)	
Gudmundur	Fridriksson	–	Director/Shareholder*
Gamoga	Jack	Nouairi	–	Director/shareholder	
*	Through	Asigau	(PNG)	Holdings	Limited	
Auditor	General’s	Office,	Special	Investigation	into	the	Office	of	
the	Public	Curator	(2005)	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 Report	 to	 Parliament	 on	 the	
Inquiry	into	the	Office	of	the	Public	Curator	(2006)	
CCS	Anvil	(PNG)	Limited	(2002‐current)
Gudmundur	Fridriksson	–	Director/Shareholder*
George	Hallit	–	Shareholder**	
*	 Though	 Anvil	 Holdings	 Limited	 and	 Palimb	
Holdings	Limited	
**	Through	Anvil	Holdings	Limited	
Report	of	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	on	the	Parliamentary	
Services	(2003)	
Auditor	General’s	Office,	Special	Investigation	into	the	Office	of	
the	Public	Curator	(2005)	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 Report	 to	 Parliament	 on	 the	
Inquiry	into	the	Office	of	the	Public	Curator	(2006)	
Report	of	the	Auditor	General	on	the	Sepik	Highway	Roads	and	
Bridges	 Maintenance	 and	 Other	 Infrastructure	 Trust	
Account	(2006)	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 Report	 to	 Parliament	 on	 the	
Inquiry	 into	 the	 Sepik	 Highway,	 Roads	 and	 Bridges	
Maintenance	and	Other	Infrastructure	Trust	Account	(2007)
Commission	of	Inquiry	into	the	Department	of	Finance	(2009)	
Ram	Business	Consultant	
Rex	Paki	–	Director/Shareholder	
Gudmundur	Fridriksson	–	Former	Employee*	
*	According	to	the	Auditor	General’s	Office	(2005)	
Mr	Fridriksson	 left	Ram	Business	Consultants	
shortly	before	May	2000	to	set	up	Anvil	(PNG)	
Project	Services	Limited	
Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 into	 the	 National	 Provident	 Fund	
(2002)	
Auditor	General’s	Office,	Special	Investigation	into	the	Office	of	
the	Public	Curator	(2005)	
Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 Report	 to	 Parliament	 on	 the	
Inquiry	into	the	Office	of	the	Public	Curator	(2006)	
Commission	of	Inquiry	into	the	Management	of	the	Investment	
Corporation	 of	 Papua	 New	 Guinea	 and	 the	 Investment	
Corporation	 Fund	 of	 Papua	 New	 Guinea	 and	 all	 Matters	
Relating	 to	 the	 Conversion	 of	 the	 Investment	 Corporation	
Fund	of	Papua	New	Guinea	to	Pacific	Balanced	Fund	(2007)	
Commission	of	Inquiry	into	the	Department	of	Finance	(2009)	
	
Source:	Investment	Promotion	Authority	and	reports	cited	in	column	2		
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The	first	footprints,	in	this	respect,	emerged	in	the	Icelandic	press,	where	doubts	were	raised	over	
a	 major	 Chinese	 industrial	 venture	 spearheaded	 by	 Fridriksson	 (Jónsson	 1992).	 This	 was	
followed	by	articles	in	the	Hong	Kong	media.	Fridriksson	was	reported	as	having	been	sued	for	
substantial	arrears	in	rent	and	hotel	tariffs	(Laxton	and	Cheung	1993;	Ng	and	Wan	1993).	More	
substantive	information	on	Fridriksson’s	commercial	affairs	emerged	after	he	relocated	to	PNG,	
following	his	marriage	 to	Air	Nuigini	 flight	attendant,	Tauhura	Asigau,	whom	he	met	 in	Hong	
Kong.		
	
The	 couple	 launched	 a	 company,	 Destination	 PNG,	which	 soon	 raised	 eyebrows	when	 it	was	
awarded	a	major	book	writing	and	publishing	contract	worth	K$2.5	million	 (approx.	US$1.92	
million)	by	the	PNG	Government.	The	book	was	to	celebrate	20	years	of	independence	in	PNG.	
Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation	correspondent,	Sean	Dorney,	claimed	the	contract	was	five	
times	the	going	market	rate	(Dorney	1996).	The	Australian	journalist,	Mary‐Louise	O’Callaghan	
(1996)	alleged	a	conflict	of	interest.	‘Mrs	[Tauhura]	Fridriksson	is	a	relative	of	Professor	Renagi	
Lohia’,	O’Callaghan	(1996)	observed,	‘who	was	chief‐of‐staff	of	the	Prime	Minister's	Office	of	Sir	
Julius	Chan,	at	the	time	Cabinet	awarded	the	job’.	In	spite	of	the	book	being	delivered	late	and	‘full	
of	sloppy	mistakes’	(O’Callaghan	1996),	it	was	lauded	by	senior	PNG	politicians.		
	
After	 the	Destination	PNG	scandal,	Fridriksson	worked	 for	 the	Port	Moresby	based	 firm,	Ram	
Business	 Consultants	 (RAM),	 whose	 principal	 is	 Rex	 Paki	 (Auditor	 General’s	 Office	 2005).	
According	to	an	Auditor	General’s	Office	investigation,	the	relationship	ended	during	early	2000.	
The	 Auditor	 General	 claims	 that	 a	 lucrative	 contract	 awarded	 to	 RAM	 providing	 corporate	
services	to	the	Public	Curator’s	Office	was	revoked	by	the	Acting	Public	Curator,	Gomoga	Jack	
Nouairi.	Nouairi	 then	 commenced	 ‘negotiations	with	Anvil	 Project	 Services	 to	provide	 similar	
advice	 and	 services’	 (Auditor	 General’s	 Office	 2005:	 43).	 This	 contract—which	was	 awarded	
without	competitive	tender8—would	see	Anvil	net	K5,120,464.	
	
Company	 records	 lodged	 with	 the	 Investment	 Promotion	 Authority	 reveal	 that	 Anvil	 (PNG)	
Project	Services	Limited	was	jointly	owned	by	Asigau	(PNG)	Holdings	Limited	(70	per	cent)	and	
Gamoga	Jack	Nouairi	(30	per	cent)	(Anvil	(PNG)	Project	Services	Limited	n.d)	(see	Diagram	2).	
Nouairi	was,	as	previously	noted,	the	Acting	Public	Curator	at	the	time	Anvil	was	awarded	the	
contract	 (Auditor	 General’s	 Office	 2005).9	 Asigau	 (PNG)	 Holdings	 Limited’s	 two	 shareholders	
were	Gudmundur	Fridriksson	and	his	wife	Tauhura.10	It	would	thus	appear	that	after	Fridriksson	
left	 RAM,	 he	 set	 up	 a	 rival	 company	 that,	 in	 effect,	 won	 a	 contract—in	 controversial	
circumstances—for	services	previously	supplied	in	part	by	RAM.	A	subsequent	inquiry	into	the	
matter	conducted	by	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	(2006:	80)—drawing	on	the	original	Auditor	
General’s	 investigation—concluded	‘the	retainer	of	Anvil	by	the	Public	Curator	was	riddled	by	
illegalities	and	an	unlawful	waste	of	Estate	monies’.	
	
In	2002	Fridriksson	established	a	second	consultancy	company,	CCS	Anvil.11	Later	the	business	
would	 include	 a	 young	 Australian	 graduate	 George	 Hallit,	 who	 would	 become	 both	 a	 PHDC	
shareholder	and	 its	Chief	Operations	Officer.	CCS	Anvil	was	awarded	a	number	of	high	profile	
contracts.	For	instance,	it	won	a	tender	to	head	the	National	Parliamentary	Efficiency	Project.	This	
project	 courted	 criticism	 in	 the	 national	 media	 when	 it	 was	 alleged	 that	 one	 of	 CCS	 Anvil’s	
consultants	was	being	‘paid	K20,000	a	fortnight	almost	three	times	the	Prime	Minister's	salary’	
(Post‐Courier,	25	April	2003:	4).	When	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	(2003:	13)	examined	the	
arrangement,	it	found	‘the	payment	of	K375,779	[approx.	US$105,000]	to	CCS	Anvil	had	exceeded	
the	original	tender	price	of	K200,000	and	also	exceeded	the	financial	delegate	limit	for	the	Clerk	
of	K300,000	Parliament	set	at	by	the	Parliamentary	Service	Act’.		
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Diagram	2:	Actors	in	the	contract	awarded	to	Anvil	(PNG)	Project	Services	Limited		
Source:	Investment	Promotion	Authority	
	
CCS	 Anvil’s	 final	 public	 footprint	 can	 be	 found	 in	 reporting	 produced	 by	 the	 Commission	 of	
Inquiry	into	the	Department	of	Finance.	Evidence	tendered	during	the	inquiry	indicates	that	CCS	
Anvil,	 in	 collaboration	 with	 Gamoga	 Jack	 Nouairi,	 aided	 a	 litigant	 to	 substantially	 inflate	 a	
compensation	claim	against	the	state—condemned	as	‘fraud’	in	the	final	report—	in	return	for	
K1.4	million	 (approx.	US$400,000)	 (Davani,	Sheehan	and	Manoa	2009:	276).	However,	by	 the	
time	this	report	was	published,	Fridriksson’s	interests	had	shifted	to	Australia	where	he	was	now	
heading	 up	 a	welfare	 reform	 programme	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	 Queensland	 and	 Australian	
governments.		
	
I	now	turn	to	Rex	Paki,	Fridriksson’s	key	local	collaborator	during	Paga	Hill	Estate’s	 inception	
(1997‐2000).	 Paki	has	 featured	prominently	 in	 anti‐corruption	 inquiries	 as	a	 result	 of	 his	 co‐
ownership	 and	 management	 of	 RAM.	 The	 previously	 mentioned	 inquiries	 into	 the	 Public	
Curator’s	Office,	for	instance,	concluded	that	RAM	had	been	paid	K1,561,062	for	18	months	work	
between	1998‐2000,	despite	the	fact	there	was	no	public	tender,	written	contract,	or	certification	
of	invoices.	The	hourly	rate	charged	by	RAM	was	also	deemed	‘excessive’	(Auditor	General’s	Office	
2005:	 42‐43;	 see	 also	 Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 2006).	 The	 Auditor	 General	 (2005:	 46)	
observed:	 ‘[o]f	particular	concern	must	be	that	after	eighteen	months	of	paying	for	services	of	
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RAM	the	only	result	that	could	be	reported	to	the	Public	Curator	was	a	small	amount	of	computer	
equipment’.		
	
RAM	 also	 featured	 in	 the	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 into	 the	 National	 Provident	 Fund.	 The	
Commission	concluded	Paki	and	his	firm	were	party	to	a	complex	fraud,	from	which	they	allegedly	
benefited	 through	 charging	 excessive	 fees	 via	 a	 contract	 secured	 through	 ‘nepotism’,	 and	 in	
violation	of	tendering	requirements	(Barnett	2002).	Later,	Paki	was	reprimanded	by	the	Supreme	
Court	of	PNG.	In	this	case	he	was	sued	for	allegedly	overcharging	Motor	Vehicle	Insurance	Limited	
by	K792,512,	when	acting	as	 liquidator.	During	the	trial,	 the	Supreme	Court	described	Paki	as	
‘evasive	and	dishonest’	(Paki	v	Motor	Vehicle	Insurance	Ltd	[2010]	PGSC	2).		
	
A	distinct	theme	emerging	from	the	evidence	contained	in	the	anti‐corruption	reporting	and	court	
archives	is	the	existence	of	a	reoccurring	commercial	strategy.	A	particular	legitimate	service	is	
offered	that	appears	in	practice	to	be	a	conduit	for	forms	of	hidden,	improper	activity	which	are	
designed	to	capture	an	amplified	share	of	revenues	from	vulnerable	consumers	(accepting	that,	
ostensibly,	the	liberal‐democratic	state	manages	public	funds	on	behalf	of	citizen	consumers).	In	
other	words,	whether	it	be	deceased	estates,	a	company	in	liquidation,	a	superannuation	fund,	or	
government	agency,	if	the	consumer	client—beneficiaries,	creditors,	retirees,	the	public—was	in	
a	weakened	position	as	their	interests	were	represented	largely	by	corrupted	institutions.	As	a	
result,	the	businesses	concerned	were	able	to	negotiate	inflated	prices	for	services	provided	and	
it	 was	 this	 augmented	 return	 which	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 the	 common	 thread	 connecting	
different	cases.	On	occasions,	the	agents	acting	on	behalf	of	the	consumer	client	were	shown	to	
be	sharing	in	the	exaggerated	profits.	The	evidence	also	suggests	the	executives	involved	were	
largely	 indifferent	 to	 the	 particular	 service	 provided:	 the	 opportunity	 for	 exaggerated	 profits	
appeared	to	be	the	prime	lure.	Furthermore,	not	only	were	state	actors	complicit	in	the	activity,	
there	was	mostly	no	follow‐up	action	by	law	enforcement	agencies	or	the	departments	involved	
even	 when	 PNG’s	 public	 oversight	 agencies	 censured	 the	 conduct,	 a	 systemic	 problem	 that	
continues	in	PNG	to	this	day.		
	
Speaking	 more	 generally,	 this	 also	 alerts	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 capitalist	 political	 economies	
generate	a	significant	opportunity	structure	for	what	David	Harvey	(1976)	refers	to	as	secondary	
forms	 of	 exploitation.	 This	 references	 the	methods	 used	 by	 capital,	 as	 a	 heterogeneous	 class	
formation,	 to	 extract	 wealth,	 largely	 from	 the	 labouring	 masses,	 outside	 the	 moment	 of	
production;	for	instance,	where	a	‘slum’	landlord,	or	an	energy	cartel,	gouge	consumers	through	
inflated	and/or	 fixed	prices.	Of	 course,	 speculative	 stratas	of	 capital	whose	business	model	 is	
rooted	 in	secondary	 forms	of	exploitation	are	 indifferent	 to	which	revenues	are	preyed	upon,	
whether	it	be	a	pension	pot,	wages,	or	taxation.	Therefore,	it	is	a	modality	of	exploitation	that	can	
assume	parasitic	forms	from	an	intra‐class	perspective.		
	
On	that	note,	it	appears	from	the	anti‐corruption	reporting	that	two	key	executives	behind	the	
Paga	Hill	Estate	are	part	of	this	speculative	strata.	That	raises	the	question	of	how	this	speculative	
repertoire	extracted	from	the	biographies	helps	to	explain	the	transaction	chain	underpinning	
the	Paga	Hill	Estate	development,	a	matter	to	which	I	now	turn.		
	
The	Paga	Hill	Estate:	Acquiring	the	land,	evicting	the	residents	
Paga	Hill	 is	divided	 into	a	series	of	 land	portions;	 the	paramount	owner	 is	 the	government	of	
PNG.12	 The	 primary	portion	 of	 land	 covering	Paga	Hill’s	 contested	 southern	 face	 is	 known	 as	
portion	 1597.	 Until	 2014,	 portion	 1597	 encompassed	 homes	 belonging	 to	 the	 government’s	
public	housing	authority,	 the	National	Housing	Corporation,	 in	addition	to	part	of	an	 informal	
settlement	which	was	established	on	the	site	shortly	after	WWII,	with	permission	from	customary	
owners	(who	were,	and	are,	fighting	for	reinstatement	of	their	customary	title),	and	government	
acquiescence.	In	total	approximately	3,400	people	lived	on	the	hill	(see	Figure	4).		
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Figure	4:	Paga	Hill,	16	May	2011		
Source:	Google	Earth	
	
From	1987	until	1999,	portion	1597	had	been	protected	from	any	further	development	after	it	
was	zoned	open	space,	and	declared	a	National	Park.13	Therefore,	during	the	data	collection	and	
analysis	process,	the	primary	objective	was	to	document	the	transaction	sequences	which	led	to	
the	reversal	of	this	policy,	and	the	awarding	of	National	Park	land	to	a	concern	seeking	to	build	‘a	
tourism	 city’.	 The	 irregular	 policy	 shift	 was	 in	 effect	 a	 symptomatic	 signal;	 the	 investigative	
methodology	then	entered	as	a	diagnostic	tool	aimed	at	uncovering	the	processes	underlying	this	
irregular	shift.		
	
First,	 key	 legal/administrative	 documents	 relating	 to	 the	 land	 deal	 upon	which	 the	 Paga	Hill	
Estate	 rests	were	 sourced.	This	 involved	 leveraging	contacts	with	Port	Moresby	professionals	
working	in	the	land	conveyancing	field.	Further	checks	were	then	conducted	at	the	Department	
of	 Lands	 and	 Physical	 Planning,	 which	 stores	 property	 data	 on	 its	 LAGIS	 Land	Management	
System.	Copies	of	the	relevant	government	gazettes	recording	the	decisions	to	rezone	the	land	
and	 award	 it	 to	 PHDC	 and	 PHLHC	 were	 also	 located.	 In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	
interrelationship	 between	 the	 landed	 transaction	 sequences	 and	 the	 corporate	 history	 of	 the	
latter	organisations,	 company	record	data	were	 triangulated	with	 land	 transactions,	modelled	
using	both	ISNA	and	transaction	mapping.	
	
To	enhance	analytical	rigour,	the	author	developed	a	working	knowledge	of	the	Land	Act	1996	
(PNG),	Land	Regulation	1999	 (PNG)	 and	Physical	Planning	Act	1989	 (PNG),	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
Companies	Act	1997	(PNG)	and	Investment	Promotion	Act	1992	(PNG).	This	legislative	material	
prescribes,	for	instance,	set	process	that	must	be	observed	when	acquiring	a	state	lease	or	when	
registering	to	conduct	business	in	PNG	as	a	foreign	enterprise.	The	challenge	then	became	one	of	
carefully	 mapping	 the	 content	 of	 key	 land,	 corporate	 and	 public	 records	 in	 order	 to	 detect	
whether	anomalies	occurred	in	the	processes	through	which	the	land	was	acquired.	Both	ISNA	
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and	 transaction	 mapping	 are	 designed	 to	 act	 as	 clinical	 tools	 that	 help	 pinpoint	 these	 illicit	
moments	from	vast	and	often	fragmented	data‐sets.	
	
The	first	transaction	of	note	was	the	incorporation	of	PHLHC,	which	became	the	initiating	vehicle	
for	the	land	venture.	The	company	was	incorporated	on	14	June	1996.	Soon	after	incorporation,	
PHLHC	initiated	legal	steps	to	have	the	Paga	Hill	land	rezoned	from	open	space,	paving	the	way	
for	a	state	lease	over	the	property	to	be	issued.	Their	initial	planning	application	was	rejected	by	
the	Physical	Planning	Board	on	11	November	1996.14		
	
Several	months	later,	however,	the	company	secured	political	support	from	the	Minister	for	Civil	
Aviation,	Culture	and	Tourism,	Michael	Nali.	Nali	undertook	to	have	the	development	endorsed	
by	Cabinet	as	a	‘property	of	National	Significance’.15	Company	records	reveal	that	Nali	acquired	a	
9	per	cent	stake	in	PHLHC’s	successor	vehicle,	PHDC,	on	16	December	2011	through	his	company	
Kwadi	 Inn	 Limited.16	 By	 this	 stage,	 Nali	 had	 lost	 his	 seat	 in	 parliament.	 Arguably	 of	 greater	
concern,	at	the	time	Nali	undertook	to	sponsor	the	project,	he	jointly	owned	a	company,	Waim	
No.	54,	with	Mary	Nali.17	Waim	No.	54	shared	a	registered	address	with	PHLHC,	while	its	Directors	
were	 Rex	 Paki	 and	 Felix	 Leyagon,	 who	 constituted	 two	 out	 of	 PHLHC’s	 three	 shareholders	
(Diagram	3).		
	
	
Diagram	3:	The	ownership	structure	of	PHLHC	and	PHDC	in	the	year	2000	
Source:	Investment	Promotion	Authority	
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With	Nali’s	support,	a	five‐year	Urban	Development	Lease	was	issued	to	PHLHC	on	6	April	1998	
(refer	 to	 Diagram	 4).	 Annual	 rent	 for	 portion	 1597	 was	 set	 at	 K30,000	 (US$16,500).18	 A	
mandatory	 improvement	 covenant	was	 also	 inserted,	 ‘to	 a	minimum	value	 of	 Three	Hundred	
Million	 Kina	 (K300,000,000.00)’	 (approximately	 US$165,000,000).	 Successful	 completion	 of	
these	covenants	would	allow	PHLHC	to	acquire	a	99‐year	state	lease	over	the	site.		
	
	
Diagram	4:	The	Paga	Hill	Land	Holding	Company	Limited	1998	network	
Source:	Investment	Promotion	Authority		
	
The	Papua	New	Guinea	National	Gazette	(2000)	reveals	that,	when	the	lease	was	issued	in	April	
1998,	the	Paga	Hill	land	was	still	zoned	open	space;	the	lease,	therefore,	was	issued	in	violation	
of	the	Land	Act	1996	 (PNG),	s	67	(Public	Accounts	Committee	2007).	 It	was	only	rezoned	two	
years	 later	 in	 2000.19	 A	 subsequent	 Public	 Accounts	 Committee	 (2007)	 inquiry	 into	 the	
administration	 of	 state	 land	 examined	 the	 initial	 acquisition	 of	 portion	 1597	 by	 PHLHC.	 In	
addition	to	noting	the	above	Land	Act	1996	(PNG)	breach,	the	committee	further	observed	that	
PHLHC	had	failed	to	both	pay	annual	rent	and	honour	the	requisite	improvement	requirement.		
	
An	important	intervening	event	occurred	in	2000.	Relations	between	Rex	Paki	and	Gudmundur	
Fridriksson	fractured,	which	appears	to	have	precipitated	a	split	in	PHLHC	management.	On	14	
August	 2000,	 Fidelity	 Management	 Pty	 Ltd—the	 Australian	 corporate	 vehicle	 linked	 to	
Fridriksson—acquired	a	recently	renamed	holding	company,	Paga	Hill	Development	Company	
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(PNG)	Limited,	from	its	Papua	New	Guinean	owner.20	Fridriksson’s	wife,	Tauhura,	and	his	Cairns	
neighbour,	 property	 developer	 Byron	 Patching,	 were	 appointed	 Directors	 of	 PHDC,	 while	
Fridriksson	became	Secretary.	PHDC	was	now	a	foreign	owned	entity,	and	seemingly	a	PHLHC	
rival.		
	
To	 lawfully	 conduct	 business	 in	 PNG,	 PHDC	 now	 required	 certification	 from	 the	 Investment	
Promotion	Authority	(see	32(4),	Investment	Promotion	Act	1992	(PNG)).21	There	is	no	record	on	
the	foreign	certification	registry	to	show	that	this	took	place.	Nevertheless,	on	1	September	2000,	
PHDC	was	awarded	a	99‐year	Business	(Commercial)	Lease	over	the	Paga	Hill	land.	It	is	unclear	
why	the	lease	was	not	issued	to	the	Urban	Development	Lease	holder,	who	is	lawfully	mandated	
to	 apply	 for	 the	upgraded	 lease	 upon	 completion	of	 the	 requisite	 covenants	 (Public	Accounts	
Committee	2007).		
	
That	aside,	there	are	a	number	of	lease	features	worth	noting.	First,	the	improvement	covenant	
dropped	from	K300	to	K10	million	(approx.	US$3.85	million).	Second,	for	a	short	period,	the	rent	
was	correctly	set	at	K250,000	(approx.	US$96,000),	which	is	5	per	cent	of	the	land’s	unimproved	
value	 (see	 Land	 Regulation	 1999	 (PNG)).	 However,	 in	 2001	 it	 was	 ‘unlawful[ly]’	 reduced	 to	
K50,000	(approx.	US$19,000)	by	a	Lands	Department	official	(Public	Accounts	Committee	2007:	
69).	The	Public	Accounts	Committee	concluded	‘prime	land	and	a	National	Park,	has	been	illegally	
given	to	a	private,	foreign	speculator	with	no	ability	to	even	pay	the	Land	Rental,	much	less	build	
anything	on	the	site’	(Public	Accounts	Committee	2007:	70).		
	
Although	this	public	verdict	did	not	prompt	substantive	action	from	the	Lands	Department,22	it	
did	stymy	PHDC’s	capacity	to	lure	investors.	Accordingly,	PHDC	set	about	countering	the	findings.	
Following	the	2007	elections,	they	lobbied	the	Public	Accounts	Committee’s	new	Chair,	Timothy	
Bonga.23	Against	the	recommendation	of	 the	committee’s	 legal	adviser	(interview,	Dame	Carol	
Kidu,	25	June	2012),	Bonga	issued	a	letter	‘clearing’	PHDC	of	any	wrongdoing.24	A	year	later	the	
company	was	issued	a	new	Business	(Commercial)	Lease	over	Paga	Hill,	which	reaffirmed	annual	
rent	 of	 K50,000,	 while	 dropping	 the	 improvement	 covenant	 from	 K10	 million	 to	 K5million	
(approx.	US$1.85	million).25	
	
PHDC’s	 ownership	 structure	 also	 underwent	 change.	 Notably,	 the	 Fridrikssons	 formally	
relinquished	 their	 legal	 interest	 in	 PHDC.	 They	 were	 replaced	 by	 a	 number	 of	 Australian	
shareholders,	including	Tracey	Veronica	Kluck	(3	per	cent).26	Kluck	is	the	wife	of	Noel	Pearson,	a	
prominent	Indigenous	Australian	lawyer	and	land	rights	activist	who	is	the	principal	architect	of	
Cape	York	Partners	and	 the	Cape	York	 Institute,	where	Fridriksson	had	 senior	 roles	between	
2008‐2012.	However,	arguably	the	most	significant	change	in	PHDC’s	shareholding	structure	was	
the	acquisition	of	a	60	per	cent	holding	by	Stanley	Liria,	the	company’s	lawyer.27	Liria	is	alleged	
to	enjoy	close	kinship	links	with	the	current	Prime	Minister,	Peter	O’Neill,28	and	commercial	ties	
with	the	Southern	Highlands	Governor,	William	Tipi.29		
	
Another	 prominent	 Southern	Highlands	 figure,	Michael	Nali,	 acquired	 a	 stake	 (9	 per	 cent)	 in	
PHDC	during	 this	 period	 through	his	 company	Kwadi	 Inn.30	Kwadi	 Inn	 also	held	 a	 significant	
interest	(10	per	cent)	in	NIU	Finance	Limited.	NIU’s	last	annual	return	list	its	Managing	Director	
as	 Peter	 O’Neill,	 PNG’s	 current	 Prime	Minister.31	 Peter	 O’Neill	 again	 appears	 as	 NIU’s	 largest	
shareholder	 through	 his	 investment	 companies.32	 This	 indicates	 that	 PHDC	 now	 possessed	
multiple	lines	of	communication	with	the	Prime	Minister	who,	in	PNG’s	political	system,	pools	
significant	executive	power.		
	
By	2012,	then,	PHDC	had,	in	effect,	washed	its	state	lease	of	the	stigma	associated	with	the	Public	
Accounts	Committee	findings	published	in	2007,	while	tying	itself	to	a	powerful	bloc	of	Southern	
Highlands	 businessmen,	 with	 close	 links	 to	 the	 Prime	 Minister.	 It	 was	 also	 more	 recently	
discovered	that	the	company	enjoys	ties	with	William	Duma,	the	State	Enterprises	Minister,	who	
has	an	equity	stake	in	the	venture	(email,	Eric	Tlozek,	23	February).	These	strategic	links,	at	least	
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in	 principle,	 placed	 PHDC	 in	 a	 strong	 position	 to	 champion	 their	 development	 within	 senior	
political	circles.	
	
The	 final	 impediment	 confronting	 PHDC	 was	 the	 3,400	 residents	 on	 Paga	 Hill.	 According	 to	
resident	representatives,	during	February	2012,	PHDC	obtained	an	order	for	their	eviction	from	
the	National	Court.	When	residents	learnt	of	the	court	order,	they	petitioned	for	a	special	sitting	
of	the	National	Court.	It	took	place	on	a	Saturday,	12	May	2012.	While	the	case	was	being	heard,	
PHDC	initiated	a	forced	eviction	exercise,	aided	by	the	Royal	PNG	Constabulary	(RPNGC).	Homes	
along	 the	 reclaimed	 land	 were	 illegally	 demolished,33	 while	 police	 employed	 live	 rounds	 of	
ammunition	 on	 residents;	 fortunately	 no	 one	 was	 killed	 or	 wounded.	 The	 home	 demolitions	
ceased	when	lawyers	returned	with	a	court	injunction	(interview,	Joe	Moses,	18	July	2013).	
	
Following	 a	 prolonged	 legal	 battle,	National	Housing	 Corporation	 residents	were	 successfully	
evicted	by	PHDC	in	May	2014	and	relocated	to	customary	land	at	Six	Mile	on	the	eastern	edge	of	
Port	Moresby,	where	they	currently	have	no	security	of	tenure.	Conversely,	settlement	residents	
won	their	Supreme	Court	appeal	on	1	July	2014.	They	continued,	however,	to	experience	ongoing	
intimidation	at	the	hands	of	the	RPNGC	and	the	Port	Moresby	City	Council	(NCDC).34	Then,	on	22	
July	 2014,	 the	 settlement	 was	 demolished,	 allegedly	 by	 the	 NCDC	 and	 Curtain	 Brothers,	 a	
company	which	had	been	contracted	to	build	a	ring	road	around	Paga	Hill	(Willie	2014).		
	
Following	the	successful	eviction	of	all	residents	from	Paga	Hill,	ground	work	operations	at	the	
site	 began	 (see	 Figure	 5).	Meanwhile,	 the	O’Neill	 government	 has	 agreed	 to	 act	 as	 an	 official	
development	 partner	 in	 the	 project,	 making	 it	 ‘one	 of	 the	 country’s	 biggest	 public‐private	
partnership	(PPP)	projects’	(The	National	2016).		
	
	
Figure	5:	Paga	Hill,	15	June	2016		
Source:	Google	Earth	
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To	 summarise,	 a	 close	 examination	 of	 the	 transaction	 sequences	 underpinning	 the	 Paga	 Hill	
Estate	reveals	numerous	anomalies,	which	indicate	portion	1597	has	potentially	been	awarded	
and	 administered	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 Land	Act	 1996	 (PNG)	 and	 Land	Regulation	 1999	 (PNG).	
Furthermore,	 for	a	period,	 the	core	corporate	entity	steering	 the	 transaction	sequence,	PHDC,	
appeared	to	operate	in	PNG	as	an	uncertified	foreign	enterprise.	Compounding	matters,	a	Public	
Accounts	Committee	report	pointed	to	further	legal	breaches,	concluding	that	the	land	had	been	
secured	corruptly	by	foreign	speculators.	These	anomalies	and	conclusions,	however,	have	not	
irreparably	harmed	PHDC’s	 fortunes.	Through	the	turbulence,	PHDC	successfully	leveraged	its	
ties	and	influence,	to	secure	national	government	backing	for	the	project.		
	
Crucially,	this	backing	has	allowed	the	company	to	maintain	its	control	over	a	piece	of	land—at	a	
discounted	rate—which,	once	developed,	will	potentially	allow	PHDC	to	realise	significant	rents	
from	this	unique	monopoly	over	harbourside	property,	in	a	market	suffering	notable	shortages	
in	 supply.	 To	 appreciate	 the	 characteristics	 of	 this	 transaction,	 it	 must	 be	 situated	 within	 a	
broader	theory	of	capitalist	social	relations	and	secondary	exploitation.		
	
To	that	end,	from	the	perspective	of	investors,	property	titles	are	financial	papers	that	gives	them	
claim	over	future	revenues	through	the	lever	of	rents	(which	can	be	capitalised	through	sale).	
That	 is,	 a	 legally	 sanctioned	monopoly	over	 a	particular	 space	 (via	private	property	 regimes)	
allows	a	charge	to	be	levied,	paid	out	of	the	consumer’s	revenues,	which	could	come	from	wages,	
salaries,	profits	of	enterprise,	taxes,	etcetra	(Harvey	1976,	2012;	Marx	1981).	In	this	sense,	money	
invested	 in	 real	 property	 accumulates	 by	 feeding	 on	 the	 revenue	 generated	 elsewhere	 in	 the	
productive	economy	(Harvey	2012).		
	
In	the	case	of	property	investors	in	PNG	who	primarily	acquire	landed	monopolies	through	the	
vehicle	of	state	leases,	the	equation	is	slightly	more	complex.	Annual	rent	must	be	paid	to	the	PNG	
government	based	on	the	land’s	unimproved	value.	The	investor,	therefore,	speculates	on	the	rent	
differential	between	the	annual	rent	owed	to	the	state,	and	the	rent	which	can	be	extracted	from	
the	market.	There	is	scope	here	for	the	rate	of	return	to	be	increased	through	different	forms	of	
manipulative	 practice,	 which	 can	 take	 lawful,	 improper	 and	 illegal	 forms.	 For	 example,	 by	
artificially	reducing	the	cost	of	acquiring	the	lease,	illegally/improperly	reducing	the	annual	rent	
owed	 to	 the	 state,	 minimising	 the	 transaction	 costs	 associated	 with	 government	 approvals,	
ignoring	time‐bound	contractual	stipulations,	and	escaping	competitive	market	pressures	with	
state	acquiescence,	the	investors	are	in	a	position	to	potentially	amplify	their	rate	of	return.		
	
It	 is	 apparent	 in	 the	 Paga	 Hill	 case	 that	 the	 developer	 coalition	 drew	 upon	 pre‐established	
repertoires	honed	in	other	sectors	in	a	bid	to	manipulate	the	rate	of	return,	a	dynamic	which,	of	
course,	 CIF	 is	 designed	 to	 uncover.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	methodology	 revealed	 evidence	 that	 key	
executives	leveraged	personal	ties	and	influence,	and	exploited	weaknesses	in	urban	governance,	
in	ways	that	enabled	them	to	decrease	rents,	reduce	acquisition	costs,	and	escape	competitive	
pressures.	Again,	 these	 tactics	were	premised	on	a	paramount	asset‐holder—the	PNG	people,	
through	the	auspices	of	the	agent‐state—being	in	a	weak	position.	Compounding	matters	in	this	
respect,	their	agent,	the	Lands	Department,	has	a	demonstrated	history	of	acting	improperly	in	
support	of	private	speculators,	over	and	above	their	mandated	responsibility	to	the	PNG	people.	
Thus,	in	the	real	estate	sector,	the	core	ingredients	that	this	commercial	repertoire—documented	
in	the	previous	section—draws	upon	to	extract	super‐profits	can	be	observed.		
	
However,	as	opposed	to	ventures	such	as	a	book	publishing	deal	with	the	national	government,	
or	the	provision	of	corporatisation	services	to	the	Public	Curator’s	Office,	for	the	Paga	Hill	land	to	
render	a	substantial	 return,	 it	will	 require	a	significant	 inward	 investment	of	capital.	This	has	
proven	a	critical	variation	to	past	ventures	pursued	by	Paga	Hill	Estate	executives.	As	a	result,	the	
transaction	sequence	has	been	elongated	as	the	developer	attempts	to	clean	its	image,	and	project	
the	right	balance	of	expertise,	professional	experience	and	political	backing	for	an	exercise	of	this	
scope.	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	company	will	succeed	in	this	respect.		
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Nevertheless,	 mobilisation	 and	 counter‐mobilisation	 within	 civil	 society	 has	 played—and	
continues	 to	 play—a	 critical	 role	 in	 determining	 the	megaproject’s	 public	 fortunes,	 a	matter	
which	will	now	be	addressed.		
	
Resisting	and	counter‐resistance	to	the	Paga	Hill	Estate	
Paga	 Hill	 residents	 resisting	 displacement	 organised	 themselves	 through	 three	 civil	 society	
organisations.	 The	 Paga	 Heritage	 Association	 managed	 the	 community’s	 legal	 defence	 in	
partnership	with	the	National	Housing	Corporation	Residents’	Committee	(interview,	Joe	Moses,	
18	 July	 2013).	 Complementing	 this	 activity,	 Paga	 Hill	 Arts	 Resistance	 channelled	 community	
energy	 into	 public	 education	 through	 demonstrations,	 art	 exhibitions	 and	 theatre	 (interview,	
Ratoos	Gary	Haoapa	and	Pius	Wasi,	14	July	2013).	They	were	supported	by	two	international	civil	
society	actors:	critical	research	on	the	proposed	development,	and	the	corporate	actors	behind	it	
was	disseminated	by	the	International	State	Crime	Initiative;	while	a	documentary	film‐maker,	
Hollie	 Fifer	 (2016),	 presented	 these	 research	 findings	 and	 the	 community’s	 story	 through	 a	
feature	length	production,	The	Opposition.	
	
To	 counter	 community	 resistance,	 PHDC	 also	 mobilised	 support	 from	 within	 civil	 society.	 A	
critical	 link	was	 forged	with	 Dame	 Carol	 Kidu,	 arguably	 PNG’s	most	 acclaimed	 human	 rights	
advocate.	Since	relocating	to	PNG	in	1969,	Kidu	has	built	an	esteemed	record	in	politics	and	civil	
society.	In	particular,	she	was	the	Member	of	Parliament	for	Moresby	South	from	1997	until	2012,	
a	constituency	that	included	Paga	Hill.	During	this	political	career,	Kidu	served	as	Minister	for	
Community	Development	from	2002	until	2011.		
	
When	the	first	demolition	exercise	occurred	in	May	2012,	Kidu	was	still	MP	for	Moresby	South.	
She	physically	 intervened	 to	 stop	 the	eviction,	 and	was	 forcefully	 escorted	 from	 the	 scene	by	
police.	When	Kidu	(2012)	was	later	criticised	for	her	‘emotional’	reaction,	she	responded	in	the	
national	press,	stating:	‘Yes	I	am	emotional	about	the	blatant	corruption,	greed	and	land	theft	in	
“modern”	PNG’.	Her	involvement	brought	to	the	grass‐roots	movement	emerging	on	Paga	Hill	a	
range	of	contacts	and	an	immense	public	profile.	During	July	2012,	Kidu	retired	from	politics,	and	
focused	her	attention	on	numerous	civil	society	roles.		
	
Then	on	1	October	2012,	Kidu	incorporated	a	consultancy	company,	CK	Consultancy	Limited.35	
With	her	strong	human	rights	profile,	Kidu	became	a	popular	choice	 for	companies	looking	to	
rehabilitate	their	public	 image	such	as	Canadian	miner,	Barrick	Gold	and	Rio	Tinto	subsidiary,	
Bougainville	Copper	Limited.	However,	 as	 far	as	 the	Paga	Hill	 case	was	concerned,	 it	was	her	
decision	to	accept	a	consultancy	contract	with	PHDC	that	struck	a	significant	blow	against	the	
resistance	movement.	
	
In	total,	CK	Consultancy	Limited	was	paid	AU$178,000	(approx.	US$160,000)	by	the	developer	to	
help	relocate	residents	 from	Paga	Hill	 to	customary	land	in	the	Six	Mile	area	of	Port	Moresby,	
which	they	would	have	to	rent	from	customary	owners	through	insecure	contractual	agreements	
(Radio	 New	 Zealand	 International	 2014).	 Kidu	 featured	 prominently	 on	 the	 developer’s	
promotional	material	and	in	media	set	pieces.	She	also	published	a	formal	letter	of	apology	for	
her	role	in	the	campaign	to	save	Paga	Hill.36		
	
Coupled	with	this	public	about‐face,	Kidu	adopted	an	adversarial	stance	with	former	allies.	For	
instance,	 she	 launched	 a	 civil	 action	 in	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 Supreme	 Court	 against	 the	
documentary	 filmmaker	Hollie	Fifer.	The	action	threatened	to	silence	the	 feature	 film	on	Paga	
Hill—which	captures	Dame	Carol’s	notable	shift	in	stance—just	as	it	was	about	to	premiere	at	a	
prestigious	film	festival	in	Canada.		
	
During	 the	 subsequent	 trial,	 it	was	 revealed	 that	PHDC	had	 ‘agreed	 to	 indemnify	 the	Plaintiff	
[Kidu]	 in	 respect	 of	 her	 costs	 of	 these	 proceedings	 and	 also	 has	 paid	 the	 AU$250,000.00	 [in	
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security]’	(Carol	Anne	Kidu	v	Hollie	Fifer	[2016]	NSWSC	982).	Justice	Rein	dismissed	Kidu’s	action,	
noting	 ‘the	 impression	gained	 is	 that	 the	Plaintiff	 is	prepared,	 for	her	own	benefit	and	that	of	
PHDC,	to	say	anything	to	stop	the	footage	taken	of	her	by	Ms	Fifer	being	broadcast’	(Carol	Anne	
Kidu	v	Hollie	Fifer	[2016]	NSWSC	982).		
	
Kidu,	 however,	 was	 not	 the	 only	 actor	 to	 lend	 their	 support	 to	 PHDC.	 The	 United	 Nations	
Development	 Programme	 (UNDP)	 lauded	 the	 company	 publicly	 for	 how	 the	 forced	 eviction	
exercise	 was	 conducted	 at	 Paga	 Hill.	 In	 front	 of	 a	 media	 contingent	 at	 a	 public	 ceremony	
celebrating	the	opening	of	the	Six	Mile	community—where	displaced	residents	were	noticeably	
housed	in	crowded	tents—the	UNDP’s	national	head	Roy	Trivedy	stated	‘what	a	fantastic	example	
has	been	set	...	it	is	an	example	not	only	for	Papua	New	Guinea	but	for	the	world’	(PHDC	2014).	
This	testimonial	now	features	prominently	in	PHDC’s	promotional	material.		
	
When	 Trivedy	 was	 subsequently	 presented	 with	 evidence	 which	 put	 into	 question	 both	 the	
integrity	and	human	rights	 credentials	of	 the	Paga	Hill	Estate,	he	 replied:	 ‘On	 the	basis	of	 the	
information	I	received,	it	was	clear	that	the	resettlement	has	led	to	positive	improvements	for	the	
community.	I	am	not	in	[a]	position	to	comment	about	other	activities	that	the	company	has	been	
involved	in’	(email,	Roy	Trivedy,	2	October	2014).	No	attempt	was	made	by	the	UNDP	to	remove	
its	brand	from	PHDC’s	promotional	material.	A	complaint	was	then	lodged	with	the	UNDP’s	Office	
of	Audit	and	Investigations.37	The	Office	declined	to	take	action.	It	claimed	that	the	developer’s	
promotional	material	mistakenly	references	 ‘UN’	Head,	Roy	Trivedy,	rather	than	 ‘UNDP’	Head;	
this	clerical	oversight,	it	was	argued,	meant	the	matter	fell	outside	the	UNDP’s	jurisdiction	(email,	
Ellen	Gardner,	15	October	2015).	
	
PHDC’s	 ascendant	 position	 in	 civil	 society	 was	 further	 boosted	 by	 a	 number	 of	 public	
interventions	by	the	RPNGC,	which	issued	a	series	of	press	releases	praising	the	company.	In	one	
media	 release,	 Superintendent	 N’dranou	 Perou	 stated:	 ‘I	 must	 commend	 the	 Chief	 Executive	
Officer	of	 the	Paga	Hill	Development	Company,	Mr	Gudmundur	Fredrickson	 [sic]	 for	not	only	
having	the	vision	to	develop	what	will	become	a	PNG	landmark,	but	also	for	having	the	heart	for	
the	former	tenants	of	the	National	Housing	Corporation’	(RPNGC	Metropolitan	Superintendent	
2014).	This	was	one	of	several	media	set	pieces	conducted	by	the	RPNGC	in	support	of	PHDC.	
During	this	period,	PHDC	also	made	a	number	of	donations	to	the	RPNGC	and	its	charitable	arm,	
the	Royal	PNG	Police	Legacy	Inc.	This	included	a	K20,000	donation	in	support	of	the	RPNGC’s	
Australasian	Police	&	Emergency	 Services	Game	 contingent	 (RPNGC	Media	Unit	 2014),	 and	 a	
property	valued	at	K1.2	million	which	was	given	to	Police	Legacy	(PHDC	2016).		
	
The	complex	network	of	support	that	rallied	behind	the	Paga	Hill	Estate	in	opposition	to	the	grass‐
roots	resistance	campaign	is	not	dealt	with	in	its	entirety	here.	It	included,	however,	charitable	
organisations	to	whom	PHDC	donated	money;	national	media	outlets	which	regularly	published	
testimonials	celebrating	the	project;	public	relations	experts	who	helped	reform	the	venture’s	
digital	 face	 and	 public	 brand;	 and	 numerous	 government	 Ministers	 who	 championed	 the	
development	 in	 public	 forums.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 trend	 observable	 in	 the	 data	 is	 the	 synthesis	
between	money	capital	and	cultural/symbolic	capital.	
	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 resistance	 efforts,	 which	 forged	 ties	 through	 a	 fabric	 of	 shared	 political,	
intellectual	 and	 social	 interests,	 the	 developer	 coalition	 rallied	 support	 from	 civil	 society	
organisations	that,	officially	speaking,	strongly	rejected	many	of	the	key	tactics	employed	in	the	
mega‐project.	This	feat	appears	to	have	been	rooted	in	part	on	the	strategic	dispersal	of	money	
capital,	 both	 through	 consultancy	 contracts	 and	 donations,	 which	 helped	 fuse	 PHDC	 to	
organisations	which	 could	 advance	 its	 legitimising	 agenda.	 The	 fact	 that	 they	professed	 goals	
antagonistic	to	the	repertories	employed	by	PHDC	and	its	project	partners	made	their	support	all	
the	more	powerful.	The	data	also	points	to	the	key	role	which	civil	society	organisations	can	play	
in	administering	‘backdoor’	attacks	designed	to	hinder	and	delegitimise	resistance	movements	
operating	from	the	margins	of	civil	society.		
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From	investigation	to	theory:	Conceptualising	the	hidden	and	routine	
A	core	argument	underpinning	this	intervention	is	that	the	development	of	systematic	units	of	
analysis,	matched	 to	 investigative	 research	methods	and	digital	 analytics,	has	 the	potential	 to	
illuminate	many	of	 the	hidden	networks	and	processes	 essential	 to	 the	organisation	of	 grand	
corruption	 in	 its	 regionally	 specific	 forms.	 The	 Paga	 Hill	 Estate—which	 the	 Public	 Accounts	
Committee	(2007:	60)	claims	was	secured	 for	 its	current	owners	through	 ‘corrupt	dealings’—
offers	 one	 case	 study	 of	 grand	 corruption’s	 probative	 power.	 To	 conclude	 the	 argument,	 the	
theoretical	implications	of	the	empirical	findings	and	the	methodology	it	rests	upon	will	now	be	
presented.	
	
The	Paga	Hill	Estate	case	study	draws	into	sharp	focus	the	notable	difference	between	appearance	
and	 substance	 when	 researching	 processes	 that	 potentially	 fit	 within	 the	 rubric	 of	 grand	
corruption.	This	assertion	has	two	layers.	First,	at	the	level	of	appearance,	the	Paga	Hill	Estate	
enjoys	 all	 the	 distinctive	marks	 of	 corporate	 social	 responsibility:	 wide	 acclaim	 from	 human	
rights	advocates	and	esteemed	civil	society	organisations;	an	executive	team	with	CVs	boasting	
connections	with	high	profile,	socially	sensitive	projects;	and	strong	engagement	with	charitable	
organisations.	However,	once	this	semblance	was	subjected	to	sustained	investigative	inquiry,	a	
more	 ambiguous	essence	emerged,	which	was	marked	by	 speculative	 commercial	 repertoires	
that	 fused	with	 a	 permissive	 urban	 governance	 regime	 to	 facilitate	 illicit	 transactions,	whilst	
criticism	was	diluted	through	the	strategic	dispersal	of	money‐capital.	
	
Second,	 the	 substantive	 reality,	 which	 emerged	 following	 fieldwork	 and	 data	 analysis,	 grates	
against	popular	stereotypes	of	activity	commonly	described	as	‘corrupt’	in	PNG.	Notable	by	their	
absence	are	‘big‐men’	politicians	most	commonly	associated	with	illicit	activities	in	PNG,	although	
they	played	an	important	auxiliary	role	in	the	Paga	Hill	Estate	project.	Nevertheless,	in	this	case,	
it	was	expatriate	business	figures	who	largely	appear	to	be	the	prime	movers	of	a	project	deemed	
corrupt	(Public	Accounts	Committee	2007).	Furthermore,	once	the	transaction	sequences	were	
examined,	 this	 case,	 when	 set	 against	 a	 broader	 commercial	 repertoire,	 was	 clearly	 not	 a	
conventional	 instance	 of	 misappropriation,	 which	 is	 a	 common	 trope	 for	 thinking	 about	
corruption	in	PNG.	Rather,	 it	pointed	to	a	more	hidden—and	arguably	more	routine—	type	of	
illicit	activity,	marked	by	regulatory	and	market	manipulation,	practices	which	are	designed	to	
dilute	competitive	pressures	and	gouge	vulnerable	asset‐holders.	Such	routine	hidden	activity,	
however,	only	becomes	apparent	if	sensitive	methodologies	are	deployed	to	capture	the	intricate	
ways	 corporate,	 commercial	 and	 political	 mechanisms	 are	 applied	 over	 prolonged	 temporal	
stretches	in	order	to	amplify	pecuniary	returns.	
	
These	findings	raise	a	number	of	important	questions.	To	what	extent	are	public	and	scholarly	
perceptions	of	activity,	which	fit	within	the	grand	corruption	frame,	shaped	by	understandings	
grounded	in	spectacular	instances	of	corruption	rather	than	its	common,	routinised,	lengthy	and	
often	unsanctioned	 forms?	And	what	 are	 the	potential	 consequences	of	 the	 cleavage	between	
perception	and	reality,	for	how	corruption	is	theorised	and	reaction	to	it?		
	
Certainly,	in	the	scholarly	literature	on	PNG,	variations	of	neo‐patrimonial	theory	are	frequently	
employed	 to	make	 sense	 of	 grand	 corruption	 (see,	 for	 example,	Kombako	2007;	Kurer	 2007;	
Larmour	 2008;	 Standish	 2007).	 Put	 simply,	 this	 argument	 explains	 corruption	 through	 the	
particular	way	individual	identity,	political	groupings	and	business	relations	in	PNG	have	become	
organised	around	clientalistic	networks	based	on	loose	forms	of	ethnic/social	solidarity,	which	
become	the	prime	levers	around	which	decisions	are	made.	While	this	framing	certainly	offers	
important	insights	into	the	mechanics	of	influence	within	elite	circles	and	the	tactics	employed	
by	ruling	class	cliques	to	diffuse	resistance	 from	below,	 it	does	not	necessarily	capture	all	 the	
dynamics	revealed	by	investigative	research.		
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For	 example,	 in	 PNG,	 approximately	 85	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 population	 remains	 rurally	 seated	 in	
largely	 independent	 and	 autonomous	 customary	 agglomerations,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 strong	
dependence	 on	 sustainable	 land	 use,	 and	 informal	 modes	 of	 governance	 fixed	 by	 customary	
norms.	 Furthermore,	 owing	 to	 the	 remoteness	 of	 many	 communities,	 combined	 with	 poor	
transport/communications	infrastructure	and	a	nascent	civil	society,	there	is	ostensibly	little	in	
the	way	of	formal	democratic	conversation	away	from	national	elections,	which	are	primarily	a	
superficial	affair.	As	a	result,	the	rural	majority	are	largely	spectators	with	an	extremely	curtailed	
view	when	it	comes	to	formal	economic	and	political	activity.	
	
Against	this	backdrop,	an	emerging	body	of	investigative	evidence	suggests	that	the	practice	of	
grand	 corruption	 in	PNG	 in	 part	 facilitates	 the	neo‐colonial	 looting	 of	 national	 resources	 and	
revenue	flows	(see,	for	example,	Numapo	2013;	Oakland	Institute	2013;	Oxfam	Australia	2014).	
The	beneficiaries	of	this	process	include	foreign	capital	and	a	class	of	local	fixers,	managers	and	
collaborators,	who	accumulate	political	power	and	wealth	from	mediating	the	activities	(which	is	
not	to	discount	the	growing	role	nationals	play	in	organising,	and	benefiting	from,	swindles).	
	
Certainly,	in	the	Paga	Hill	Estate	case	study,	evidence	and	reporting	that	documented	a	business	
clique	led	by	Australian‐based	executives	can	be	observed.	They	are	alleged	to	have	leveraged	a	
network	of	personal	and	commercial	ties	to	circumvent	different	forms	of	market	regulation	and	
competition,	in	order	to	inflate	profit	yields	from	service	contracts	and	to	acquire	a	prime	state	
asset	at	a	discounted	price.	In	both	instances,	this	saw	a	higher	proportion	of	state	revenues	being	
taken	(or	denied)	by	those	companies	concerned	than	if	they	had	observed	governance	norms.	
This	 pattern	 of	 deviant	 conduct	 can	 also	 be	 observed	 more	 widely	 in	 PNG,	 including	 in	 the	
forestry,	fisheries,	and	real‐estate	sectors,	and	in	the	significant	market	for	government	contracts	
relating	to	 infrastructure	development	and	professional	services.	The	cumulative	effect	of	this	
activity	is	that	a	privileged	nexus	of	national	powerbrokers	and	a	foreign	investor	class	are	seizing	
a	 growing	 share	 of	 national	 revenues	 and	 assets	 through	 deviant	means,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	
working	class	households	and	a	sizable	landed	peasantry.		
	
To	understand	this	regionalised	dynamic	gleamed	from	investigative	research,	supplementation	
of	 more	 orthodox	 frameworks—such	 as	 neopatrimonialism—is	 needed,	 with	 theoretical	
approaches	capable	of	unpacking	the	ways	that	global	capitalism	is	able	to	systemically	foster	
stratas	 of	 speculative	 investors	who	 employ	market/commercial	 transactions	 to	 yield	 super‐
profits,	through	various	forms	of	manipulation.	Elsewhere	I	have	argued	this	requires	a	serious	
reengagement	with	Marx’s	 theoretical	work	 (Lasslett	 2013,	 2014;	Lasslett	 et	 al.	 2015),	which	
offers	an	overarching	framing	for	understanding	how	a	global	system	rooted	in	the	extraction	of	
surplus	value	can	also	 foster	muscular	tracts	of	secondary	exploitation	(Lasslett	 forthcoming).	
Additionally,	 when	 thinking	 about	 this	 dynamic	 in	 settings	 such	 as	 PNG,	 there	 is	 persuasive	
evidence	that	this	theory	could	yield	more	results	if	married	to	insights	developed	within	the	neo‐
colonial	canon.	The	latter	body	of	theory	helps	focus	attention	on	the	way	geographically‐rooted	
forms	of	north/south	exploitation	can	be	maintained	within	a	post‐colonial	setting	of	notionally	
independent	nation‐states.	Continuing	exploitation	is	ultimately	defined	by	enduring	disparities	
of	power,	which	see	exploitative	and	iniquitous	relations	maintained	through	a	new	armoury	of	
techniques	and	methods.		
	
This	leads	to	the	final	point.	CIF	and	other	novel	methodological	approaches	being	developed	by	
investigative	 researchers	 are	 not	 only	 a	 means	 for	 building	 rich	 descriptions	 of	 potentially	
corrupt	 practices.	 Although	 these	 rich	 descriptions	 have	 intrinsic	 importance,	 they	 are	 also	 a	
critical	instrument	for	achieving	more	nuanced	theoretical	approximations	of	the	mechanisms,	
processes	and	structures	that	sustain	different	regionalised	regimes	of	grand	corruption.	Only	
when	a	mass	of	empirical	data‐sets	exists,	ones	that	are	systematic	and	capable	of	detecting	grand	
corruption	 even	 in	 its	 most	 subtle	 and	 opaque	 forms,	 can	 the	 building	 of	 robust	 theoretical	
traditions	that	help	explain	this	phenomenon	begin.	All	of	these	aspects	put	into	question	how	
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effective	 existing	 anti‐corruption	 efforts	 can	 be	 when	 such	 a	 theoretical	 task	 remains	 in	 an	
embryonic	state	to	this	day.		
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